could be true purely in virtue of meaning.") This consensus stems not so much from Quine's (1951) arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction; for even though those arguments have played a major role in shaping the contemporary terrain, there is less and less agreement all the time about their cogency, or upshot.
2 Rather, many philosophers are careful to line up onside with Quine's flat-footed insistence that 'no
[statement] is true but reality makes it so ' (1970, 10) . 3 Vague though Quine's dictum is, it does have an unassailable air, and it seems to be in tension with TVM.
However, there is an understanding of TVM to which Quine's dictum is irrelevant. (Arguably, it is the core of the notion, historically and conceptually; however, my interest here is to establish its coherence and usefulness, not its historical pedigree.
4 )
The conception in question sees TVM as, first and foremost, a source of justification that is neither empiricist nor Platonist. (By 'empiricist' I mean the view that experience is the only legitimate source of justification. By 'Platonist' I mean the sort of rationalism which takes a non-natural relation between a mind and non-spatio-temporal entities to be a legitimate source of justification. These stipulations are crude, but I just use them for stage-setting.) There are familiar reasons (which I will not rehearse) for thinking that empiricist justification cannot adequately account for all of our knowledge, and that Platonist justification is too obscure to be of much help. A brute datum is that we are justified in believing some statements that are universal in scope, and not subject to refutation by contingent happenstance, such as:
[1] All squares have four sides.
[2] No grandmother is childless.
[3] Two is a factor of every even number.
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[4] One cannot steal one's own property.
The challenge is to explain how such beliefs are justified in a way that avoids both the inadequacy objection to empiricism and the obscurity objection to Platonism. As I use the term here, TVM is a strategy to deal with that challenge. At the core, the idea is that grasp of the meanings of the constituent terms is sufficient to justify the belief in the truth of such statements. In such cases, understanding of meaning grounds the recognition of truth.
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There are of course many problems with this strategy -a lot of questions need to be answered, before we should be convinced that TVM can fulfill its promise to afford an adequate, non-obscure account of our justification for (at least some of our) universal, necessary knowledge. (Cf. Quine (1951) for a classic statement of some problems, and BonJour (1998, Ch.2) for a recent survey.) However, the present point is that TVM, thus understood, is hardly inconsistent with Quine's dictum. As I will explain in § §4-6, appeal to grasp of meaning as a source of justification does not commit one to the view that there is something unreal or supernatural at work, grounding the truth of some magical class of statements. So, insofar as Quine's dictum is a central reason motivating the widespread opinion that TVM can do no serious, rigorous work in philosophy, this widespread opinion lacks justification.
In short, then, one of my aims is to explain why TVM is not inconsistent with Quine's dictum. Insofar as Quine's view is that both meaning and reality play a role in determining the truth-value of any statement, then I entirely agree. However, there is no compelling inference from here to a general, comprehensive case against the TVM story about justification. Alternatively, there is much to be said for the view that there is a 5 continuum, not a categorical border, between contingent empirical propositions and those akin to [1]-[4] . However, to try to get from here to a general, comprehensive case against TVM is like trying to argue that nothing is either black or white from the premise that there is an indefinite range of shades of grey. This inference is far from compelling; and, even if it were compelling, it still might not amount to sufficient reason to reject or reclassify the brute datum.
the matter of 'meaning'
One of the reasons why there has been relatively little discussion of TVM in recent decades is that there is such a wide variety of distinct theoretical approaches to meaning.
There are orientations that take the basis of meaning to be sense, reference, use, intentions, and truth-conditions; each of these orientations has distinct sub-varieties, and that list is far from exhaustive. As a result, it is hard to be any more precise about exactly what a particular claim of TVM comes to (in addition to saying that grasp of meaning grounds recognition of truth), without alienating a large percentage of the participants in these debates. To proceed in terms of any of sense, reference, use, intentions, or truthconditions would be controversial; while to appeal to all of them would be untidy and vague.
For present purposes, though, it is neither necessary nor desirable to pin 'meaning' down more precisely. The only ones who ought to feel alienated by this discussion are the meaning-skeptics. By §6, I will be in a position to explain why, if meaning is determinate, then there will be statements to which the TVM story about justification applies. 6 That is, whichever approach to meaning to which one subscribes, as 4. the critical equivocation in the case against TVM I take Quine's (1970, 10-12) argument based on the dictum that no statement is true but reality makes it so (cf. note 3), and a closely related argument of Boghossian's (1997, 334-7) , to be representative of a prevalent line of thought, explicit statements of a widespread but implicit view. The aim of this section is to show that these arguments are flawed by a fallacy of equivocation.
Note first that Boghossian (1997) explicitly adheres to Quine's dictum that all statements owe their truth-value to something distinct from meaning, which he severally 7 characterizes as 'reality', 'the world' or 'the facts'. For ease of exposition, I will stick to 'the facts', and I will abbreviate this version of Quine's dictum (i.e., 'no statement is true but that the facts make it so') as 'TVF'. The structure of this case against TVM, then, is as follows:
P#1: TVF is unassailable.
P#2: TVF is incompatible with TVM.
Therefore, TVM is untenable.
This argument commits a fallacy of equivocation. There is a sense of 'fact' according to which TVF is unassailable, and a sense of 'fact' according to which TVF is incompatible with TVM. However, these are distinct senses of the term. There is no one reading that makes both premises true. Thus, this case against TVM is flawed.
Consider first P#1, which Boghossian motivates with the following sorts of consideration:
After all, if a statement is known a priori, then it must be true. And if it is true then it must be factual, capable of being true or false. (1997, 334) In this sense of 'factual', to be factual is to be truth-evaluable -it is to make a claim, or to have truth-conditions. Note how heterogeneous the correlative conception of a fact must This is the sense of 'factual' involved in Quine's (1970, 10-12) Tarski-inspired argument described in note 3. If the criterion for counting as factual is to issue in a truth when plugged into the schema: 'S' is T iff S, then it is not a very discriminating property.
Since this notion of 'fact' does not correspond to any precise or homogeneous metaphysical category, I will call it the 'Tarski-semantic notion of fact'.
Given this Tarski-semantic sense of fact, P#1 is uncontroversial, but P#2 is far from obvious. Consider, for example: There is a distinct, more metaphysically robust, conception of fact, given which P#2 fares much better. It is a long way from Tarskian schemas, though, closer to what Armstrong (1996) calls 'truth-makers', or to Russell's (1918) and Wittgenstein's (1921) logical atoms. Facts in this sense are discrete mind-independent entities to which contingent, empirical statements stand in some specific semantic relation (such as representation). Famously, Russell and Wittgenstein quarreled over whether it is a fact, in this sense, that there is no rhinoceros in the room. With respect to metaphysical worries about this variety of fact, negative existentials are just the tip of the iceberg. Russell (1918) seems to have never been able to convince himself of the existence of such general facts as that all humans are mortal, though he recognizes that his current views of meaningfulness seem to commit him to such entities. (Cf. Lewis (1998) for some related 10 objections to Armstrong (1996) . 7 ) Russell (1918, 211) reports having "nearly produced a riot" at Harvard in 1914 by arguing for the existence of negative facts. Surely, the claim that "'There is no rhinoceros in this room' is T iff there is no rhinoceros in this room"
would not have provoked such a reaction -even if the pragmatists would have disputed it.
It is in this second, metaphysical sense of 'fact' that the approach to a priori knowledge associated with Hume (1748) In this metaphysical sense of 'fact', there is some tension between TVF and TVM. To be factual, in this metaphysical sense, is to represent a contingent, empirical state of affairs; for any statement that represents a contingent, empirical state of affairs, there is reason to think that the TVM story about justification is probably inappropriate.
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The price of this strategy of saving P#2 from imposing a false dilemma, though, is P#1. If we read 'factual' in this metaphysical sense, then TVF is eminently assailable, as is evidenced by Hume's (1748) reasons for positing relations of ideas in the first place, by Russell's (1918) struggles with negative and general facts, and by Lewis' (1998) criticisms of Armstrong (1996) . In short, in order to make P#2 true, you have to think of TVF and TVM as mutually exclusive answers to an Armstrong-style demand for truthmakers. This issues an understanding of TVF that may well be interesting and even defensible, at least for a broad class of statements, but is certainly assailable. So, given this second, metaphysical sense of 'fact', P#1 is controversial, not the sort of thing to which one can help oneself on the strength of vague slogans, or disquotational schemas.
To sum up: Quine (1970, 10-12) and Boghossian (1997, 334-7) provide clear illustrations of a prevalent line of thought that is widely but mistakenly thought to spell the end for TVM. The semblance of a compelling case against TVM depends on taking 'factual' in the Tarski-semantic sense in P#1 while taking it in the metaphysical-truthmaker sense in P#2. Once we recognize and guard against this slide, either P#1 is extremely contentious (if we adhere to the metaphysical-truth-maker sense of 'factual') or else P#2 is false (if we adhere to the Tarski-semantic sense of 'factual'). So, there is no cogent case against TVM forthcoming down this avenue.
Given that these arguments against the coherence of TVM are lame, and provided that we have an account of TVM that unequivocally rejects the notion that meaning has supernatural truth-making powers (which is the primary aim of § §5-6), TVM may yet hold some promise to provide a compelling account of justification, for at least some of our universal, necessary knowledge.
5. a straw conception of TVM I will briefly describe a straw conception of TVM, for two reasons. First, I want to explicitly distinguish it from the view I will subsequently develop, and second, it will lead us into a crucial point about linguistic conventions.
The straw conception of TVM has it that, as Boghossian (1997, 336) puts it, "our meaning p by S makes it the case that p". The idea here seems to be that our meaning conventions have the power to move things about in mind-and language-independent reality, to change the nature of the things about which we think and talk. This sort of view takes our meaning-conventions to be one of the candidate answers to the Armstrong-style demand for truth-makers -and an answer that clearly excludes anything language-independent (be it reality, or the facts, or what have you) from any truthmaking role. It takes our meaning-conventions to have some magical potency to change the ordo essendi. Boghossian (1997) clearly rejects this conception of TVM, as embodying everything that is wrong with an irredeemably confused conception of analyticity. I, too, want nothing to do with this strange view. However, as far as I can tell, no one ever held this view. In particular, I see no reason to ascribe any such view to the conventionalists in the philosophy of logic against whom Quine (1935; 1954) was arguing -or, more generally, to the logical empiricists against whom Quine (1951) No one in the neighborhood has any reason, or tendency, to claim that conventions have the power to shape or transform language-independent reality.
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There is, however, an incontrovertible point in the neighborhood of the above straw conception of TVM. The straw conception has it that:
[S] Our meaning p by S makes it the case that p.
In contrast, the distinct, more refined point is that: Perhaps not surprisingly, given his rhetorical goals, Quine was prone to run roughshod over this distinction between the conventional link between S and p, on the one hand, and the truth-conditions of p, on the other. Consider, for example:
The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would be false if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would also be false if 'killed' had the sense of 'begat'. (Quine, 1951, 36) Insofar as this line of thought is tending toward the conclusion that "…in general the truth of statements does obviously depend upon both language and upon extralinguistic fact …" (Quine 1951, 41) , then well and good. However, Quine is not content to stop there; he is after further conclusions to which his entitlement is questionable, such as that TVM is incoherent or worthless.
The flaw in Quine's reasoning here is crucial to present concerns. Quine treats these two separate truth-value-determining-factors (i.e., the conventional link between S and p, and the truth-conditions of p) as if they were equivalent in status. Stalnaker's first question is the conventional one; whereas modal questions only pertain at the level of the second question, subsequent to settling on answers to the first question.
So, first we settle on our meaning-conventions, and hold them fixed; then we can inquire into such special modal status as a priority or necessity. Bearing this distinction in mind, we are now in a position to articulate a coherent and useful conception of TVM.
6. what, exactly, does it mean to say that something is true in virtue of meaning?
The notion of mind-and language-independent necessity became much more widely accepted in the latter decades of the 20 th century, after enduring varying degrees of neglect or hostility throughout and well beyond the Modern period. Fallacies and confusions were detected in several varieties of argument against the coherence of metaphysical necessity, and rigorous semantics for modal discourse were developed. 13 We post-Kripkeans are more at home with many varieties of modal attributions; even if there is still much controversy as to understanding the exact content and import of such attributions. That is, metaphysicians of many different stripes and orientations can agree that it is not possible for something to have the property 'square' but not be four-sided; to have the property 'grandmother' without ever having (or having adopted) children; to have the property 'water' but not be H 2 O. It is at least commonplace, if not orthodox, in these liberal times, to accept mind-and language-independent necessary connections among properties.
Assuming that there are such necessary connections among properties, and assuming that meaning is determinate, there will be candidates for the TVM story about justification. That is, if our meaning-conventions determine that 'square' and 'foursided', or that 'grandmother' and 'childless', express certain properties, and if it is intelligible and evident that there are necessary relations between such pairs of properties, then there will be propositions such that grasp of their meaning is sufficient for recognition of their truth. Here the above distinction between conventional links between S and p and truth-conditions of p is crucial. First, it is a contingent conventional accident that such symbols as 'F' or 'G' are used to express the properties that they in fact express; still, it may yet be a metaphysical necessity that all Fs are G. Given that some relations among properties are not vulnerable to refutation by contingent happenstance, it would be awfully odd if we were somehow barred from making statements whose role is to express such exceptionless relations.
So, there is good reason to think that, in some cases, just a grasp of the concepts F and G is sufficient to justify the belief that all Fs are G. Given the paucity of good alternative accounts of a priori justification, this TVM story about justification merits serious attention. At the very least, I hope it is clear that this TVM story about justification has nothing to do with Boghossian's (1997) metaphysical conception of analyticity, and nothing to do with denying factual content to a priori truth, in the Tarskisemantic sense of 'factual'. There is nothing obscure or magical at work here; the only requisite ingredients are necessary relations among properties and conventional relations between expressions and properties. Of course, both metaphysical necessity and the determinacy of meaning are problematic notions, and I have not even attempted to argue in favor of the coherence or indispensability of either notion here. The present point is just that anyone who accepts both the notions of necessity and of meaning has already purchased all the ingredients for the TVM story about justification (cf. note 6); since TVM is widely held to be such a far cry more contentious that either metaphysical necessity or the determinacy of meaning, the point is worth making.
Clearly, though, there are some necessary truths to which the TVM-story does not apply. Central here are necessary a posteriori cases involving identifying the essence of a natural kind (such as 'water is H 2 O' or 'heat is the motion of molecules'). The question of how to distinguish the TVM-necessities from the non-TVM necessities leads us into another central theme from Quine (1951) , which I will call 'the challenge of revisability'.
the challenge of revisability
A longstanding and central plank of Quine's crusade against special modal categoriessuch as necessary truth and a priori knowledge -is the claim that all human knowledge is revisable. (Cf. Quine (1951, §6) for the classic statement.) Looking back over the course of history, this claim looks scarcely deniable. For example, that space is Euclidean, that whales are fish, that there can be no such thing as a sub-atomic particle (since 'smallest, indivisible' was originally part of the sense of 'atom'), etc., were all once considered to be justified a priori, but are no longer so-classified; and it is hard to see how to
conclusively rule out such a change in status of our beliefs. The question is what this phenomenon of revisablility entails, for the study of modal distinctions. I will briefly describe three responses to this challenge of revisability, which I will call 'skepticism', 'absolutism', and 'revisionism'.
Modal skeptics follow Quine (1951) in holding that the challenge of revisability shows that there are no special modal categories, that the web of belief is seamless. (Cf.
Devitt (2004) for a recent statement of modal skepticism.) The skeptic's biggest problem is the original adequacy objection to strict empiricism -i.e., the brute datum will not go away. I have seen no compelling case for skepticism; and, in any case, my present interests lie elsewhere.
14 Modal absolutists dig in their heels and insist that immunity to recalcitrant experience is a central component of these special modal categories; so to hold that a priori justification is revisable, for example, is to change the subject. 15 Frege (1884, 3) gives colorful expression to the absolutists' creed: "An a priori error is thus as complete a nonsense as, say, a blue concept". Modal absolutism is a central plank in the traditional canon -for example, the view that knowledge of necessary truths can only be justified a priori, which is explicitly endorsed by Kant (1784, [B15] ) among many others, depends upon this presumption that there is some supernatural potency about a priority. However, absolutists must claim that these putative revisability-cases are actually cases in which one just mistakenly thought that one's belief (e.g., about Euclidean geometry, atoms, or whales) was justified a priori. Among the problems with this option is that the notion of a priority becomes only useful for infallible agents, because agents like us could never conclusively justify the claim that something is knowable a priori. Thus, the absolutists' notion of a priority would be ill-suited to much work in epistemology. In any case, most contemporary theorists seem to be wary of modal absolutism -for example, it is explicitly considered and rejected by BonJour (1998, Ch.4), Field (2000) , Peacocke and Boghossian (2000) , Railton (2000) , and Casullo (2003, Ch.2) . Crudely put, even if
Quine's challenge of revisability does not suffice to support modal skepticism, it does amount to a rather strong case against modal absolutism.
Modal revisionists side with Carnap (1950) against Quine (1951) in retaining modal distinctions but admitting that they are in some sense framework-relative. 16 According to both Coffa (1991, Ch.10) and Friedman (2000, 370) , the first clear articulation of revisionism occurs in Reichenbach (1920) . Reichenbach alleges that Kant uses 'a priori' in two distinct senses -on the one hand, to mean necessary and eternal, and on the other hand, to mean constitutive of the concept of the object of knowledge -20 and goes on to argue that a moral of the theory of relativity is that the former be dropped while the latter retained. Revisionism seeks to define a principled middle ground between absolutism and skepticism about a priori justification, based on this notion of the constitutive but non-absolute a priori. The revisionists' response to the challenge of revisability is to retain the concept of a priority, in many core senses of the term, while explicitly rejecting certain other of its traditional associations (such as necessity or infallibility). In addition to Carnap's (1950) linguistic frameworks, this tack on the a priori is also widely associated with Wittgenstein (1969) . Much interesting and challenging recent work on the a priori consist of variations on this revisionist themecf., e.g., Field (2000) , Friedman (2000) , Railton (2000) .
In the next section, I will return to the pending question about distinguishing the TVM-necessities from the non-TVM necessities. First, I will further motivate my preferred variant of TVM-revisionism by explaining how it dovetails with distinction between alethic and epistemic modalities. 17 As Kripke (1972, 34-8) points out, necessity and a priority are distinct concepts. Necessity is a notion of metaphysics: a statement expresses a necessary truth if and only if what it expresses could not possibly be false. In contrast, a priority is an epistemological concept: a statement is justified a priori if an only if it can be known to be true independently of experience. Since necessity and a priority attribute different properties to a statement, different standards of evaluation apply:
[Necessity] in and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of anything. It's certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary is a priori. (Kripke, 1972, 36) Kripke (1972) goes on to argue that there are both necessary a posteriori statements and contingent a priori statements.
A corollary that is of particular interest in the present context is that, while alethic modalities are mind-and language-independent matters of metaphysics, epistemic modalities are thoroughly mind-and language-dependent. That which is necessary is not revisable, for it is precisely the things which are the most firmly bolted down that that concept is used to single out. (Of course, any particular agent's guesses as to what is necessary may be revised over time, as a function of evidence, insight, etc.; but the truthconditions of 'It is necessary that P' do not change over time.) However, for fallible agents like us, it is only prudent good sense to hold that what counts as justified a priori will vary as do our beliefs and the concepts which they involve. So, for a post-Kripkean framework-revisionist, a major difference between attributions of alethic modality (e.g., 'It is necessary that P') and attributions of epistemic modality (e.g., 'My belief that P is justified a priori') is that the truth-conditions change over time only in the epistemic case. Metaphysical necessity is framework-independent, whereas a priori justification is framework-relative.
For example, if it is necessary that heat is the motion of molecules, then it did not just become necessary once it occurred to someone, or once it became sufficiently verified and accepted by the experts. Metaphysical necessities could not have been otherwise, and are categorically indifferent to whether anyone knows anything about 22 them. In contrast, my favored revisionism holds that 'It is justified a priori that whales are fish' and 'It is justified a priori that atoms are indivisible' were once true, but are now false. Note though that change in the truth-conditions of an attribution of epistemic modality can occur only given an updating of the relevant framework -i.e., such a change depends on a significant change to the content of at least one of the relevant constituent concepts. This explains the qualified but still significant sense in which this sort of revisionism retains an indefeasibility requirement (cf. note 16). My ancestors'
belief that whales are fish has not been falsified, because whales still do satisfy the relevant superficial, unscientific criteria -i.e., their concept of 'fish' was something like 'anything that lives in water, swims, and is more-or-less shaped like a tuna'. But, in my dialect, it is not true, let alone justified a priori, that whales are fish. My concept of 'fish' is a rather distinct ancestor of theirs, a much more precise biological kind term, which differs in conditions of satisfaction. (Cf. note 19 for further refinement.)
So, Kripke's distinction lends credence to the revisionists' tenet that epistemic modalities are revisable, framework-relative, subject to re-evaluation in cases of conceptual change. Thus, absolutism about epistemic modalities is not just immodest;
further, Carnap (1950) , Quine (1951 ), Wittgenstein (1969 , and Kripke (1972) converge in showing this arrogance to betray a deep mistake. Our beliefs get updated, our concepts evolve; it is to be expected that any non-empirical (conceptual, rational, etc.) sources of justification are directly and thoroughly effected by such epistemic developments and conceptual revolutions.
Next issue: What does this have to do with TVM? First, I will make a weaker point that is, strictly speaking, sufficient for my present dialectical aims. Second, I will 23 foray a stronger point that offers a compelling answer to the question, left pending at the end of §6, of defining the set of TVM necessities.
The weaker point is simply that, if, as there is considerable reason to believe, the challenge of revisability does not show up as worthless the notion of a priori justification -it points to problems with unrefined conceptions of a priority, but does little to alter our intuitions about the brute datum -then revisability is also compatible with TVM. Indeed, it is to be expected that the set of statements to which the TVM story about justification applies will vary as do beliefs and the concepts they involve. Therefore, the challenge of revisability does not entail the incoherence or worthlessness of TVM, but rather points to a valuable refinement.
Of course this weaker point will do nothing to sway a committed absolutist or skeptic. If one takes refuge in absolutism about a priority, then presumably one will want to make similar claims about TVM, and if one follows the skeptics in thinking that the challenge of revisability sours a priority, one will presumably think the same of TVM.
However, the TVM-absolutist takes on all of the problems with which the a prioriabsolutist must contend, and then some (cf. Quine (1951) , Bonjour (1998 , Ch.2), Casullo (2003 , and the skeptic still has the brute datum to contend with. On balance, then, it seems clear that we are justified in further pursuing TVM-revisionism. So, then, on to the stronger point.
which necessary truths are TVM?
My conjecture is that there are three, individually sufficient and jointly exhaustive, conditions for counting as a TVM-necessity. To begin, we must distinguish between social-conventional reality and mind-and language-independent reality. (Cf. Cassam (2000) for more on this distinction; Cassam relies heavily on the work of Locke and Kant.) Cassam's (2000, 59) examples of social-conventional phenomena include that January has 31 days, and that suicide is the taking of one's life. We enjoy a sort of privileged access to social-conventional phenomena, precisely because what grounds these phenomena, and holds them in place, is our thought and talk. There is no mystery as to how we can have non-empirical justification for these kinds of universal, necessary beliefs about all Januarys, suicides, or bachelors, because we are co-constructors of the data themselves.
In contrast, natural kind terms are the paradigm case of expressions whose content is mind-and language-independent phenomena. To use a term as a natural kind term involves a deferential, Lockian 'I know not what', intention. That is, on most typical uses, terms like 'tiger' or 'water' are used to refer to some mind-and languageindependent kind of thing or stuff, the precise criteria of identity for which is typically unbeknownst to speakers who nonetheless count as competent with the term. Nonempirical justification in this case would be an entirely different matter. If a speaker's intention in uttering 'tiger' or 'water' is this natural-kind, deferential, whatever-it-isexactly-that-constitutes-the-real-essence-of-this, then the speaker does not have the same kind of transparent access to the content of the propositions they are expressing, as they do in the case of social-conventional kinds. So, provided that the term in question is used as a natural kind term, in the above sense, then essence-identifying, a posteriori, non-TVM necessities can occur (e.g., 'Gold is the element with atomic number 79'). 18 
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At some point, given that beliefs get updated and concepts evolve, what used to be necessary a posteriori may become better suited to the TVM story about justification.
Perhaps this will happen to 'Whales are mammals'-it was thought to be false, then it was thought to be necessary a posteriori, and eventually, the fact that one cannot be a whale without being a mammal may very well come to be thought of as a constitutive a priori truth. (Perhaps this already has happened. Certainly, I want nothing to do with the idea that there is a precise point at which a shift occurs. After all, revisionists too are repairing our ship while at sea.) In any case, there is reason to think that there can be TVM-necessities beyond the bounds of social-conventional reality, even apart from the more generally conceded cases of logic and mathematics. They are precisely the truths that, although mind-and language-independent, have been bolted down for so long, relatively securely, that they have become ingrained in the content of the relevant concepts.
The three individually sufficient and jointly exhaustive conditions for being a TVM-necessity, then, are: [1] necessary relations among properties that, while they pertain to mind-and language-independent phenomena, they have been so deeply believed for so long that they have become constitutive elements of the conceptual fabric (e.g., cats are animals 19 Some prevalent arguments against TVM do not in fact bear upon its coherence or worth.
The notion has not been proven incoherent, and it still may well be our best hope for an adequate, non-obscure solution to the problem of a priori knowledge. So, there is good reason to further pursue this account of non-empirical, non-Platonist justification.
It is crucial to see that it is metaphysical necessity, not magic, which explains why candidates for TVM-status are not vulnerable to disconfirmation. Some statements are immune to recalcitrant experiences because of necessary relations among properties; the 27 particular content of the relevant meaning-conventions explains why a specific statement expresses some such specific relation. 20 There are lots of difficult questions about the adequacy of this TVM-account of justification. To mention just one: BonJour (1998, Ch.2) and Cassam (2000) press the case that the TVM story about justification will ultimately collapse into Platonism anyway, once its adherents are forced to come up with a comprehensive explanation of exactly what is involved in recognizing instances of TVM. If BonJour and Cassam are right, there comes a point at which the TVM-adherent must appeal to the very sort of rational intuition or 'mental seeing' that invites some of the classic obscurity objections to Platonism. One of the tasks attendant upon the TVM-adherents, then, is an explanation of this notion of 'grasp of meaning', including especially an account of how it differs from rational intuition.
The reason to retain TVM is that the brute datum is not going away. Given the lack of other viable accounts of our universal, necessary knowledge, this avenue ought to be further explored.
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1 Cf. Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002) for extensive discussions of a closely related question (i.e., the question of the different epistemic statuses of 'a=a' vs. 'a=b', on a Millian approach to names).
2 Cf. Boghossian (1997) , BonJour (1998, Ch. 3), Sober and Hylton (2000) , and Casullo (2003, Ch.5 ) for a variety of critical discussions of exactly what Quine's (1951) arguments establish. The key point for present purposes is that there are those (such as Boghossian and BonJour) who unequivocally reject both TVM and Quine's position on the analytic/synthetic distinction.
3 I replace Quine's term 'sentence' with 'statement'. Quine's dictum plays a central role in Boghossian (1997) and Cassam (2000) , for example; I take these works to explicitly illustrate a prevalent presumption that this dictum is an inviolable constraint. Quine's (1970, 10-12) argument in favor of this dictum runs as follows: The truth-conditions of any statement can be specified "as Tarski taught us" via the schema: 'S' is T iff S. The disquoted S on the right hand side of the biconditional stands for a fact, an element of reality; and this is so whether the left-hand quoted 'S' expresses a contingency (such as 'Quine speaks Portuguese') or a triviality (such as 'All Portuguese speakers speak Portuguese'). Therefore, no statement is true but reality makes it so. This argument is discussed in §4. G. Russell (2007) for further motivation for that latter claim.)
